Preface THIS BOOK IS an introduction to the theory of portfolio choice and asset pricing in multiperiod settings under uncertainty. An alternate title might be Arbitrage, Optimality, and Equilibrium, because the book is built around the three basic constraints on asset prices: absence of arbitrage, single-agent optimality, and market equilibrium. The most important unifying principle is that any of these three conditions implies that there are "state prices," meaning positive discount factors, one for each state and date, such that the price of any security is merely the state-price weighted sum of its future payoffs. This idea can be traced to the invention by Arrow (1953) of the general equilibrium model of security markets. Identifying the state prices is the major task at hand. Technicalities are given relatively little emphasis so as to simplify these concepts and to make plain the similarities between discrete-and continuous-time models.
To someone who came out of graduate school in the mid-eighties, the decade spanning roughly 1969-79 seems like a golden age of dynamic asset pricing theory. Robert Merton started continuous-time financial modeling with his explicit dynamic programming solution for optimal portfolio and consumption policies. This set the stage for his 1973 general equilibrium model of security prices, another milestone. His next major contribution was his arbitrage-based proof of the option pricing formula introduced by Fisher Black and Myron Scholes in 1973, and his continual development of that approach to derivative pricing. The Black-Scholes model now seems to be, by far, the most important single breakthrough of this "golden decade," and ranks alone with the Modigliani and Miller (1958) Theorem and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) in its overall importance for financial theory and practice. A tremendously influential simplification of the Black-Scholes model appeared in the "binomial" option pricing model of Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) , who drew on an insight of Bill Sharpe.
Working with discrete-time models, LeRoy (1973) , Rubinstein (1976), and Lucas (1978) developed multiperiod extensions of the CAPM. The "Lucas model" is the "vanilla flavor" of equilibrium asset pricing models. The simplest multiperiod representation of the CAPM finally appeared in Doug Breeden's continuous-time consumption-based CAPM, published in 1979. Although not published until 1985, the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model of the term structure of interest rates appeared in the mid-seventies and is still the premier textbook example of a continuous-time general equilibrium asset pricing model with practical applications. It also ranks as one of the key breakthroughs of that decade. Finally, extending the ideas of Cox and Ross (1976) and Ross (1978) , Harrison and Kreps (1979) gave an almost definitive conceptual structure to the whole theory of dynamic security prices.
Theoretical developments in the period since 1979, with relatively few exceptions, have been a mopping-up operation. Assumptions have been weakened, there have been noteworthy extensions and illustrative models, and the various problems have become much more unified under the umbrella of the Harrison-Kreps model of equivalent martingale measures. For example, the standard approach to optimal portfolio and consumption choice in continuous-time settings has become the martingale method of Cox and Huang (1989) . An essentially final version of the relationship between the absence of arbitrage and the existence of equivalent martingale measures was finally obtained by Delbaen and Schachermayer (1999) .
On the applied side, markets have experienced an explosion of new valuation techniques, hedging applications, and security innovation, much of this based on the Black-Scholes and related arbitrage models. No major investment bank, for example, lacks the experts or computer technology required to implement advanced mathematical models of the term structure. Because of the wealth of new applications, there has been a significant development of special models to treat stochastic volatility, jump behavior including default, and the term structure of interest rates, along with many econometric advances designed to take advantage of the resulting improvements in richness and tractability.
Although it is difficult to predict where the theory will go next, in order to promote faster progress by people coming into the field it seems wise to have some of the basics condensed into a textbook. This book is designed to be a streamlined course text, not a research monograph. Much generality is sacrificed for expositional reasons, and there is relatively little emphasis on mathematical rigor or on the existence of general equilibrium. As its title indicates, I am treating only the theoretical side of the story. Although it might be useful to tie the theory to the empirical side of asset pricing, we have excellent treatments of the econometric modeling of financial data, such as Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) and Gourieroux and Jasiak (2000) . I also leave out some important aspects of functioning security markets, such as asymmetric information and transactions costs. I have chosen to develop only some of the essential ideas of dynamic asset pricing, and even these are more than enough to put into one book or into a one-semester course.
Other books whose treatments overlap with some of the topics treated here include Avelleneda and Laurence (2000), Björk (1998 ), Cochrane (2001 , Cvitanić and Zapatero (2004) , Dana and Jeanblanc (1998) , Demange and Rochet (1992) , Dewynne and Wilmott (1994) , Dothan (1990) , Duffie (1988b) , Föllmer and Schied (2002) , Harris (1987) , Huang and Litzenberger (1988 ), Ingersoll (1987 ), Jarrow (1988 , Karatzas (1997) , Karatzas and Shreve (1998) , Lamberton and Lapeyre (1997) , Magill and Quinzii (1994) , Merton (1990) , Musiela and Rutkowski (1997) , Neftci (2000) , Pliska (1997) , Shreve (2004b) , Shreve (2004a) , Stokey and Lucas (1989) , Wilmott, Dewynne, and Howison (1993), and Wilmott, Howison, and Dewynne (1995) . Each has its own aims and themes. I hope that readers will find some advantage in having yet another perspective.
A reasonable way to teach a shorter course on continuous-time asset pricing out of this book is to begin with Chapter 1 or 2 as an introduction to the basic notion of state prices and then to go directly to Chapters 5 through 11. Chapter 12, on numerical methods, could be skipped at some cost to the student's ability to implement the results. There is no direct dependence of any results in Chapters 5 through 12 on the first four chapters.
For mathematical preparation, little beyond undergraduate analysis, as in Bartle (1976) , and linear algebra is assumed. Some familiarity with Royden (1968) or a similar text on functional analysis and measure theory, would also be useful. Some background in microeconomics would be useful, say Kreps (1990 ) or Luenberger (1995 . Familiarity with probability theory at the level of Jacod and Protter (2000), for example, would also speed things along, although measure theory is not used heavily. In any case, a series of appendices supplies all of the required concepts and definitions from probability theory and stochastic calculus. Additional useful references in this regard are Brémaud (1981) , Karatzas and Shreve (1988) , Revuz and Yor (1991), and Protter (2004) .
Students seem to learn best by doing problem exercises. Each chapter has exercises and notes to the literature. I have tried to be thorough in giving sources for results whenever possible and plead that any cases in which I have mistaken or missed sources be brought to my attention for correction. The notation and terminology throughout is fairly standard. I use R to denote the real line and R = R ∪ {−∞, +∞} for the extended real line. For any set Z and positive integer n, I use Z n for the set of n-tuples of the form (z 1 , . . . , z n ) with z i in Z for all i. An example is R n . The conventions used for inequalities in any context are
• x > 0 means that x is nonnegative and not zero, but not necessarily strictly positive in all coordinates;
• x ≫ 0 means x is strictly positive in every possible sense. The phrase "x is strictly positive" means the same thing. For
Although warnings will be given at appropriate times, it should be kept in mind that X = Y will be used to mean equality almost everywhere or almost surely, as the case may be. The same caveat applies to each of the above inequalities. A real-valued function F on an ordered set (such as R n ) is increasing if F (x) ≥ F (y) whenever x ≥ y and strictly increasing if F (x) > F (y) whenever x > y. When the domain and range of a function are implicitly obvious, the notation "x → F (x)" means the function that maps x to F (x); for example, x → x 2 means the function F : R → R defined by F (x) = x 2 . Also, while warnings appear at appropriate places, it is worth pointing out again here that for ease of exposition, a continuoustime "process" will be defined throughout as a jointly (product) measurable function on Ω × [0, T ], where [0, T ] is the given time interval and (Ω, F , P ) is the given underlying probability space.
The first four chapters are in a discrete-time setting with a discrete set of states. This should ease the development of intuition for the models to be found in chapters 5 through 12. The three pillars of the theory, arbitrage, optimality, and equilibrium, are developed repeatedly in different settings. Chapter 1 is the basic single-period model. Chapter 2 extends the results of Chapter 1 to many periods. Chapter 3 specializes Chapter 2 to a Markov setting and illustrates dynamic programming as an alternate solution technique. The Ho-and-Lee and Black-Derman-Toy term-structure models are included as exercises. Chapter 4 is an infinite-horizon counterpart to Chapter 3 that has become known as the Lucas model.
The focus of the theory is the notion of state prices, which specify the price of any security as the state-price weighted sum or expectation of the security's state-contingent dividends. In a finite-dimensional setting, there exist state prices if and only if there is no arbitrage. The same fact is true in infinite-dimensional settings under technical regularity conditions. Given an agent's optimal portfolio choice, a state-price vector is given by that agent's utility gradient. In an equilibrium with Pareto optimality, a state-price vector is likewise given by a representative agent's utility gradient at the economy's aggregate consumption process.
Chapters 5 through 11 develop a continuous-time version of the theory. Although the major part of this is based on continuous information, in some of the exercises, and especially in Chapter 11, there is a transition to discontinuous information, that is, settings in which the conditional probability of some events do not adjust continuously with the passage of time. An example is Poisson arrival.
Chapter 5 introduces the continuous-trading model and develops the Black-Scholes partial differential equation (PDE) for arbitrage-free prices of derivative securities. The Harrison-Kreps model of equivalent martingale measures is presented in Chapter 6 in parallel with the theory of state prices in continuous time. Chapter 7 presents models of the term structure of interest rates, including the Black-Derman-Toy, Vasicek, Cox-Ingersoll-Ross, and Heath-Jarrow-Morton models, as well as extensions. Chapter 8 presents specific classes of derivative securities, such as futures, forwards, American options, and lookback options. Chapter 8 also introduces models of option pricing with stochastic volatility. The notion of an "affine" state process is used heavily in Chapters 7 and 8 for its analytical tractability. Chapter 9 is a summary of optimal continuous-time portfolio choice, using both dynamic programming and an approach involving equivalent martingale measures or state prices. Chapter 10 is a summary of security pricing in an equilibrium setting. Included are such well-known models as Breeden's consumptionbased capital asset pricing model and the general equilibrium version of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model of the term structure of interest rates. Chapter 11 deals with the valuation of corporate securities, such as debt and equity.
The chapter moves from models based on the capital structure of the corporation, in which default is defined in terms of the sufficiency of assets, to models based on an assumed process for the default arrival intensity. Chapter 12 outlines three numerical methods for calculating derivative security prices in a continuous-time setting: binomial approximation, Monte Carlo simulation of a discrete-time approximation of security prices, and finite-difference solution of the associated PDE for the asset price or the fundamental solution.
In preparing the first edition, I relied on help from many people, in addition to those mentioned above who developed this theory. In 1982, Michael Harrison gave a class at Stanford that had a major effect on my understanding and research goals. Beside me in that class was Chi-fu Huang; we learned much of this material together, becoming close friends and collaborators. I owe him a lot. I am grateful to Niko and Vana Skiadas, who treated me with overwhelming warmth and hospitality at their home on Skiathos, where parts of the first draft were written.
I For the reader's convenience, the original preface has been revised for this fourth edition. Significant improvements have been made in most chapters. Errors are my own responsibility, and I hope to hear of them and any other comments from readers.
I. Discrete-Time Models
This first part of the book takes place in a discrete-time setting with a discrete set of states. This should ease the development of intuition for the models to be found in Part II. The three pillars of the theory, arbitrage, optimality, and equilibrium, are developed repeatedly in different settings. Chapter 1 is the basic single-period model, and includes the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Chapter 2 extends the results of Chapter 1 to many periods. Chapter 3 specializes Chapter 2 to a Markov setting and illustrates dynamic programming as an alternate solution technique. The Ho-and-Lee and BlackDerman-Toy term-structure models are included as exercises. Chapter 4 is an infinite-horizon counterpart to Chapter 3 that has become known as the Lucas model.
The focus of the theory is the notion of state prices, which specify the price of any security as the state-price weighted sum or expectation of the security's state-contingent dividends. In a finite-dimensional setting, there exist state prices if and only if there is no arbitrage. The same is true in infinite-dimensional settings under technical regularity conditions. Given an agent's optimal portfolio choice, a state-price vector is given by that agent's utility gradient. In an equilibrium with Pareto optimality, a state-price vector is likewise given by a representative agent's utility gradient at the economy's aggregate consumption process.
Chapter 1 Introduction to State Pricing
This chapter introduces the basic ideas in a finite-state one-period setting. In many basic senses, each subsequent chapter merely repeats this one from a new perspective. The objective is a characterization of security prices in terms of "state prices," one for each state of the world. The price of a given security is simply the state-price weighted sum of its payoffs in the different states. One can treat a state price as the "shadow price," or Lagrange multiplier, for wealth contingent on a given state of the world. We obtain a characterization of state prices, first based on the absence of arbitrage, then based on the first-order conditions for optimal portfolio choice of a given agent, and finally from the first-order conditions for Pareto optimality in an equilibrium with complete markets. State prices are connected with the "beta" model for excess expected returns, a special case of which is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Many readers will find this chapter to be a review of standard results. In most cases, here and throughout, technical conditions are imposed that give up much generality so as to simplify the exposition.
1A Arbitrage and State Prices
Uncertainty is represented here by a finite set {1, . . . , S} of states, one of which will be revealed as true. The N securities are given by an N × S matrix D, with D ij denoting the number of units of account paid by security i in state j. The security prices are given by some q in R N . A portfolio θ ∈ R N has market value q · θ and payoff
An arbitrage is therefore, in effect, a portfolio offering "something for nothing." Not surprisingly, it will later be shown that an arbitrage is naturally ruled out, and this gives a characterization of security prices as follows. A stateprice vector is a vector ψ in R S ++ with q = Dψ. We can think of ψ j as the marginal cost of obtaining an additional unit of account in state j.
Theorem. There is no arbitrage if and only if there is a state-price vector.
Proof:
The proof is an application of the Separating Hyperplane Theorem. Suppose K ∩M = {0}. The Separating Hyperplane Theorem (in a version for closed cones that is found in Appendix B) implies the existence of a nonzero linear functional F : L → R such that F (z) < F (x) for all z in M and nonzero x in K. Since M is a linear space, this implies that F (z) = 0 for all z in M and that F (x) > 0 for all nonzero x in K. The latter fact implies that there is some α > 0 in R and
The vector ψ/α is therefore a state-price vector. Conversely, if a state-price vector ψ exists, then for any θ, we have q · θ = ψ ⊤ D ⊤ θ. Thus, when D ⊤ θ ≥ 0, we have q · θ ≥ 0, and when D ⊤ θ > 0, we have q · θ > 0, so there is no arbitrage.
1B Risk-Neutral Probabilities
We can view any p in R S + with p 1 + · · · + p S = 1 as a vector of probabilities of the corresponding states. Given a state-price vector ψ for the dividend-price pair (D, q), let ψ 0 = ψ 1 + · · · + ψ S and, for any state j, letψ j = ψ j /ψ 0 . We now have a vector (ψ 1 , . . . ,ψ S ) of probabilities and can write, for an arbitrary security i,
viewing the normalized price of the security as its expected payoff under specially chosen "risk-neutral" probabilities. If there exists a portfolio θ with D ⊤ θ = (1, 1, . . . , 1), then ψ 0 = θ · q is the discount on riskless borrowing and, for any security i, q i = ψ 0Ê (D i ), showing any security's price to be its discounted expected payoff in this sense of artificially constructed probabilities.
1C Optimality and Asset Pricing
Suppose the dividend-price pair (D, q) is given. An agent is defined by a strictly increasing utility function U : R S + → R and an endowment e in R S + . This leaves the budget-feasible set
and the problem sup c ∈ X(q,e) U(c).
We will suppose for this section that there is some portfolio θ 0 with payoff
Because U is strictly increasing, the wealth constraint q · θ ≤ 0 is then binding at an optimum. That is, if c
Proposition. If there is a solution to (1), then there is no arbitrage. If U is continuous and there is no arbitrage, then there is a solution to (1).
Proof is left as an exercise.
Theorem. Suppose that c * is a strictly positive solution to (1), that U is continuously differentiable at c * , and that the vector ∂U(c * ) of partial derivatives of U at c * is strictly positive. Then there is some scalar λ > 0 such that λ∂U(c * ) is a state-price vector.
Proof: The first-order condition for optimality is that for any θ with q·θ = 0, the marginal utility for buying the portfolio θ is zero. This is expressed more precisely in the following way. The strict positivity of c * implies that for any portfolio θ, there is some scalar k > 0 such that c
Suppose q ·θ = 0. The optimality of c * implies that g θ is maximized at α = 0. The first-order condition for this is that g 
Thus µ > 0. We let λ = 1/µ, obtaining
implying that λ∂U(c * ) is a state-price vector.
Although we have assumed that U is strictly increasing, this does not necessarily mean that ∂U(c * ) ≫ 0. If U is concave and strictly increasing, however, it is always true that ∂U(c * ) ≫ 0.
Corollary. Suppose U is concave and differentiable at some c * = e+D ⊤ θ * ≫ 0, with q · θ * = 0. Then c * is optimal if and only if λ∂U(c * ) is a state-price vector for some scalar λ > 0.
This follows from the sufficiency of the first-order optimality conditions for concave objective functions. The idea is illustrated in Figure 1 .2. In that figure, there are only two states, and a state-price vector is a suitably normalized nonzero positive vector orthogonal to the set B = {D ⊤ θ : q · θ = 0} of budget-neutral consumption adjustments. The first-order condition for optimality of c * is that movement in any feasible direction away from c * has
1C.
Optimality and Asset Pricing 15 negative or zero marginal utility, which is equivalent to the statement that the budget-neutral set is tangent at c * to the preferred set {c : U(c) ≥ U(c * )}, as shown in the figure. This is equivalent to the statement that ∂U(c * ) is orthogonal to B, consistent with the last corollary. Figure 1 .3 illustrates a strictly suboptimal consumption choice c, at which the derivative vector ∂U(c) is not co-linear with the state-price vector ψ.
We consider the special case of an expected utility function U, defined by a given vector p of probabilities and by some u : R + → R according to
For c ≫ 0, if u is differentiable, then ∂U(c) j = p j u ′ (c j ). For this expected utility function, (2) therefore applies if and only if
with the obvious notational convention. As we saw in Section 1B, one can also write (2) or (4), with the "risk-neutral" Proposition. Suppose markets are complete and (θ 1 , . . . , θ m , q) is an equilibrium. Then the associated equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal. This is sometimes known as The First Welfare Theorem. The proof, requiring only the strict monotonicity of utilities, is left as an exercise. We have established the sufficiency of complete markets for Pareto optimality. The necessity of complete markets for the Pareto optimality of equilibrium allocations does not always follow. For example, if the initial endowment allocation (e 1 , . . . , e m ) happens by chance to be Pareto optimal, then any equilibrium allocation is also Pareto optimal, regardless of the span of securities. It would be unusual, however, for the initial endowment to be Pareto optimal. Although beyond the scope of this book, it can be shown that with incomplete markets and under natural assumptions on utility, for almost every endowment, the equilibrium allocation is not Pareto optimal.
1E Optimality and Representative Agents
Aside from its allocational implications, Pareto optimality is also a convenient property for the purpose of security pricing. In order to see this, consider, for each vector λ ∈ R m + of "agent weights," the utility function
Lemma. Suppose that, for all i, U i is concave. An allocation (c 1 , . . . , c m ) that is feasible is Pareto optimal if and only if there is some nonzero λ ∈ R m + such that (c 1 , . . . , c m ) solves (6) at x = e = c 1 + · · · + c m .
Proof: Suppose that (c 1 , . . . , c m ) is Pareto optimal. For any allocation x, let U(x) = (U 1 (x 1 ), . . . , U m (x m )). Next, let
where A is the set of feasible allocations. Let J = {y ∈ R m + : y = 0}. Since U is convex (by the concavity of utility functions) and J ∩ U is empty (by Pareto optimality), the Separating Hyperplane Theorem (Appendix B) implies that there is a nonzero vector λ in R m such that λ · y ≤ λ · z for each y in U and each z in J. Since 0 ∈ U, we know that λ ≥ 0, proving the first part of the result. The second part is easy to show as an exercise.
Proposition. Suppose that markets are complete, that (θ 1 , . . . , θ m , q) is an equilibrium and that, for all i, U i is concave. . Then there exists some nonzero λ ∈ R m + such that (0, q) is a (no-trade) equilibrium for the singleagent economy [(U λ , e), D] defined by (6). Moreover, the equilibrium consumption allocation (c 1 , . . . , c m ) solves the allocation problem (6) at the aggregate endowment. That is, U λ (e) = i λ i U i (c i ).
Proof:
Since there is an equilibrium, there is no arbitrage, and therefore there is a state-price vector ψ. Since markets are complete, this implies that the problem of any agent i can be reduced to
We can assume that e i is not zero, for otherwise c i = 0 and agent i can be eliminated from the problem without loss of generality. By the Saddle Point Theorem of Appendix B, there is a Lagrange multiplier α i ≥ 0 such that c i solves the problem
(The Slater condition is satisfied since e i is not zero and ψ ≫ 0.) Since U i is strictly increasing,
This shows that (c 1 , . . . , c m ) solves the allocation problem (6). We must also show that no trade is optimal for the single agent with utility function U λ and endowment e. If not, there is some x in R S + such that U λ (x) > U λ (e) and ψ · x ≤ ψ · e. By the definition of U λ , this would imply the existence of an allocation (x 1 , . . . , x m ), not necessarily feasible, such that
Putting these two inequalities together, we would have
which contradicts the fact that, for each agent i, (c i , α i ) is a saddle point for that agent's problem. Corollary 1. If, moreover, e ≫ 0 and U λ is continuously differentiable at e, then λ can be chosen so that ∂U λ (e) is a state-price vector, meaning
The differentiability of U λ at e is implied by the differentiability, for some
(See Exercise 10(C).)
Corollary 2. Suppose there is a fixed vector p of state probabilities such that, for all i,
In this case, (7) is equivalent to q = E[Du ′ λ (e)]. Extensions of this representative-agent asset pricing formula will crop up frequently in later chapters.
1F State-Price Beta Models
We fix a vector p ≫ 0 in R S of probabilities for this section, and for any x in R S we write E(x) = p 1 x 1 + · · · + p S x S . For any x and π in R S , we take xπ to be the vector (x 1 π 1 , . . . , x S π S ).
Proposition. A dividend-price pair (D, q) admits no arbitrage if and only if there is some π ≫ 0 in R S such that q = E(Dπ).
Proof: Given a state-price vector ψ, let π s = ψ s /p s . Conversely, if π has the assumed property, then ψ s = p s π s defines a state-price vector ψ.
Given (D, q), we refer to any vector π given by this result as a state-price deflator. (The terms state-price density and state-price kernel are often used synonymously with state-price deflator.) For example, the representativeagent pricing model of Corollary 2 of Section 1E shows that we can take
For any x and y in R S , the covariance cov(x, y) ≡ E(xy) − E(x)E(y) is a measure of covariation between x and y that is useful in asset pricing applications. For any such x and y with var(y) ≡ cov(y, y) = 0, we can always represent x in the form x = α + βy + ǫ, where β = cov(y, x)/var(y), where cov(y, ǫ) = E(ǫ) = 0, and where α is a scalar. This linear regression of x on y is uniquely defined. The coefficient β is called the associated regression coefficient.
Suppose (D, q) admits no arbitrage. For any portfolio θ with q · θ = 0, the return on θ is the vector
Fixing a state-price deflator π, for any such portfolio θ, we have E(πR θ ) = 1. Suppose there is a riskless portfolio, meaning some portfolio θ with constant return R 0 . We then call R 0 the riskless return. A bit of algebra shows that for any portfolio θ with a return, we have
.
Thus, covariation with π has a negative effect on expected return, as natural from the interpretation of state prices as shadow prices for wealth. The correlation between any x and y in R S is zero if either has zero variance, and is otherwise defined by
There is always a portfolio θ * solving the problem
If there is such a portfolio θ * with a return R * having nonzero variance, then it can be shown as an exercise that, for any return R θ ,
where
If markets are complete, then R * is of course perfectly correlated with the state-price deflator.
Formula (9) is a state-price beta model, showing excess expected returns on portfolios to be proportional to the excess return on a portfolio having maximal correlation with a state-price deflator, where the constant of proportionality is the associated regression coefficient. The formula can be extended to the case in which there is no riskless return. Another exercise carries this idea, under additional assumptions, to the Capital Asset Pricing Model, or CAPM. (3) that (2) is equivalent to (4).
Exercises
Exercise 1.4 Prove the existence of an equilibrium as defined in Section 1D under these assumptions: There exists some portfolio θ with payoff D ⊤ θ > 0 and, for all i, e i ≫ 0 and U i is continuous, strictly concave, and strictly increasing. This is a demanding exercise, and calls for the following general result.
Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem. Suppose Z is a nonempty convex compact subset of R n , and for each x in Z, ϕ(x) is a nonempty convex compact subset of Z. Suppose also that {(x, y) ∈ Z × Z : x ∈ ϕ(y)} is closed. Then there exists x * in Z such that x * ∈ ϕ(x * ).
Exercise 1.5 Prove Proposition 1D. Hint: The maintained assumption of strict monotonicity of U i ( · ) should be used.
Exercise 1.6 Suppose that the endowment allocation (e 1 , . . . , e m ) is Pareto optimal.
(A) Show, as claimed in Section 1D, that any equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.
(B) Suppose that there is some portfolio θ with D ⊤ θ > 0 and, for all i, that U i is concave and e i ≫ 0. Show that (e 1 , . . . , e m ) is itself an equilibrium allocation.
Exercise 1.7 Prove Proposition 1C. Hint: A continuous real-valued function on a compact set has a maximum. Property (c) can be replaced with the assumption of regular preferences, as defined in a source cited in the Notes.
(A) Show that the assumption that U λ is continuously differentiable at e is justified and, moreover, that for each i there is a scalar γ i > 0 such that ∂U λ (e) = γ i ∂U i (c i ). (This co-linearity is known as "equal marginal rates of substitution," a property of any Pareto optimal allocation.) Hint: Use the following: Implicit Function Theorem. Suppose for given m and n that f : R m × R n → R n is C k (k times continuously differentiable) for some k ≥ 1. Suppose also that the n × n matrix ∂ y f (x, y) of partial derivatives of f with respect to its second argument is nonsingular at some (x, y). If f (x, y) = 0, then there exist scalars ǫ > 0 and δ > 0 and a
(B) Show that the negative-definite part of condition (c) is satisfied if e ≫ 0 and, for all i, U i is an expected utility function of the form
, where u i is strictly concave with an unbounded derivative on (0, ∞).
(C) Obtain the result of part (A) without assuming the existence of second derivatives of the utilities. (You would therefore not exploit the Hessian matrix or Implicit Function Theorem.) As the first (and main) step, show the following. Given a concave function
For any feasible allocation (c 1 , . . . , c m ) and (B) Assuming no arbitrage for the three securities, calculate the call-option price C explicitly in terms of q 1 , G, R, B, and K. Find the state-price probabilitiesψ 1 andψ 2 referred to in Section 1B in terms of G, B, and R, and show that C = R −1Ê (D 3 ), whereÊ denotes expectation with respect to (ψ 1 ,ψ 2 ). 
for positive constants A and B, where cov(D, e) ∈ R N is the vector of covariances between the security dividends and the aggregate endowment.
Suppose for a given portfolio θ that each of the following is well defined:
• the return R M on a portfolio M with payoff D ⊤ M = e;
• the return R 0 on a portfolio θ 0 with cov(D ⊤ θ 0 , e) = 0;
The return R M is sometimes called the market return. The return R 0 is called the zerobeta return and is the return on a riskless bond if one exists. Prove the "beta" form of the CAPM
(B) Part (A) relies on the completeness of markets. Without assuming complete markets, but supposing that the equilibrium allocation (c 1 , . . . , c m ) is strictly positive, show that the same beta form (11) applies, provided we extend the definition of the market return R M to be the return on any portfolio solving
For complete markets, corr(R M , e) = 1, so the result of part (A) is a special case.
(C) The CAPM applies essentially as stated without the quadratic expected-utility assumption provided that each agent i is strictly variance-averse, in that U i (x) > U i (y) whenever E(x) = E(y) and var(x) < var(y). Formalize this statement by providing a reasonable set of supporting technical conditions.
We remark that a common alternative formulation of the CAPM allows security portfolios in initial endowmentsθ 1 , . . . ,θ m with m i=1θ i j = 1 for all j. In this case, with the total endowment e redefined by e = (B) Given a solution θ to (8) such that R θ is well defined with nonzero variance, prove (9).
(C) Reformulate (9) for the case in which there is no riskless return by redefining R 0 to be the expected return on any portfolio θ such that R θ is well defined and cov(R θ , π) = 0, assuming such a portfolio exists. Exercise 1.17 Prove the following.
Riesz Representation Theorem. Suppose F : R S → R is linear. Then there is a unique π in R S such that, for all x in R S , we have F (x) = E(πx).
The following hint is unnecessary in this simple setting but allows the result to be extended to a broad variety of spaces called Hilbert spaces. Given a vector space L, a function ( · | · ) : L × L → R is called an inner product for L if, for any x, y, and z in L and any scalar α, we have the five properties:
Suppose a finite-dimensional vector space L has an inner product ( · | · ). (This defines a special case of a Hilbert space.) Two vectors x and y are defined to be orthogonal if (x | y) = 0. For any linear subspace H of L and any x in L, it can be shown that there is a unique y in H such that (x − y | z) = 0 for all z in H. This vector y is the orthogonal projection in L of x onto H, and solves the problem min h∈H x − h . Let L = R S . For any x and y in L, let (x | y) = E(xy). We must show that given a linear functional F , there is a unique π with F (x) = (π | x) for all x. Let J = {x : F (x) = 0}. If J = L, then F is the zero functional, and the unique representation is π = 0. If not, there is some z such that F (z) = 1 and (z | x) = 0 for all x in J. Show this using the idea of orthogonal projection. Then show that π = z/(z | z) represents F , using the fact that for any x, we have x − F (x)z ∈ J. Exercise 1.18 Suppose there are m = 2 consumers, A and B, with identical utilities for consumption c 1 and c 2 in states 1 and 2 given by U (c 1 , c 2 ) = 0.2 √ c 1 + 0.5 log c 2 . There is a total endowment of e 1 = 25 units of consumption in state 1.
(A) Suppose that markets are complete and that, in a given equilibrium, consumer A's consumption is 9 units in state 1 and 10 units in state 2. What is the total endowment e 2 in state 2? (B) Continuing under the assumptions of part (A), suppose there are two securities. The first is a riskless bond paying 10 units of consumption in each state. The second is a risky asset paying 5 units of consumption in state 1 and 10 units in state 2. In equilibrium, what is the ratio of the price of the bond to that of the risky asset? Exercise 1.19 There are two states of the world, labeled 1 and 2, two agents, and two securities, both paying units of the consumption numeraire good. The risky security pays a total of 1 unit in state 1 and pays 3 units in state 2. The riskless security pays 1 unit in each state. Each agent is initially endowed with half of the total supply of the risky security. There are no other endowments. (The riskless security is in zero net supply.) The two agents assign equal probabilities to the two states. One of the agents is riskneutral, with utility function E(c) for state-contingent consumption c, and can consume negatively or positively in both states. The other, risk-averse, agent has utility E( √ c) for nonnegative state-contingent consumption. Solve for the equilibrium allocation of the two securities in a competitive equilibrium.
Exercise 1.20 Consider a setting with two assets A and B, only, both paying off the same random variable X, whose value is non-negative in every state and non-zero with strictly positive probability. Asset A has price p, while asset B has price q. An arbitrage is then a portfolio (α, β) ∈ R 2 of the two assets whose total payoff αX + βX is non-negative and whose initial price αp + βq is strictly negative, or whose total payoff is non-zero with strictly positive probability and always non-negative, and whose initial price is negative or zero.
(A) Assuming no restrictions on portfolios, and no transactions costs or frictions, state the set of arbitrage-free prices (p, q). (State precisely the appropriate subset of R 2 .) (B) Assuming no short sales (α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0), state the set of arbitrage-free prices (p, q).
(C) Now suppose that A and B can be short sold, but that asset A can be short sold only by paying an extra fee of φ > 0 per unit sold short. There are no other fees of any kind. Provide the obvious new definition of "no arbitrage" in precise mathematical terms, and state the set of arbitrage-free prices.
Notes
The basic approach of this chapter follows Arrow (1953) , taking a general-equilibrium perspective originating with Walras (1877). Black (1995) offers a perspective on the general equilibrium approach and a critique of other approaches. Textbook treatments of financial economics covering the themes of Chapter 1 include those of Cvitanić and Zapatero (2004) , Eichberger and Harper (1997), Huang and Litzenberger (1988) , LeRoy and Werner (2001), and Lengwiler (2004) .
1A:
The state-pricing implications of no arbitrage found in Section 1A originate with Ross (1978) .
1B:
The idea of "risk-neutral probabilities" apparently originates with Arrow (1970), a revision of Arrow (1953) , and appears as well in Drèze (1971) .
1C: This material is standard.
1D: Proposition 1D is the First Welfare Theorem of Arrow (1951) and Debreu (1954) . The generic inoptimality of incomplete-markets equilibrium allocations can be gleaned from sources cited by Geanakoplos (1990) . Indeed, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) show that even a reasonable notion of constrained optimality generically fails in certain incomplete-markets settings. See, however, Kajii (1994) and references cited in the Notes of Chapter 2 for mitigating results. Mas-Colell (1987) and Werner (1991) also treat constrained optimality.
1E:
The "representative-agent" approach goes back, at least, to Negishi (1960) . The existence of a representative agent is no more than an illustrative simplification in this setting, and should not be confused with the more demanding notion of aggregation of Gorman (1953) found in Exercise 15. In Chapter 10, the existence of a representative agent with smooth utility, based on Exercise 11, is important for technical reasons.
1F:
The "beta model" for pricing goes back, in the case of mean-variance preferences, to the capital asset pricing model, or CAPM, of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) . The version without a riskless asset is due to Black (1972) . Allingham (1991 ), Berk (1992 ), and Nielsen (1990a , 1990b address the existence of equilibrium in the CAPM. Characterization of the mean-variance model and two-fund separation is provided by Bottazzi, Hens, and Löffler (1994) , Nielsen (1993b), and Nielsen (1993a) . Löffler (1996) provides sufficient conditions for variance aversion in terms of mean-variance preferences.
Additional Topics: Ross (1976) introduced the arbitrage pricing theory, a multifactor model of asset returns that, in terms of expected returns, can be thought of as an extension of the CAPM. In this regard, see also Bray (1994a), Bray (1994b) and Gilles and LeRoy (1991) . Balasko and Cass (1986) and Balasko, Cass, and Siconolfi (1990) treat equilibrium with constrained participation in security trading. See, also, Hara (1994) . Debreu (1972) provides a notion of regular preferences that substitutes for the existence of a negative-definite Hessian matrix of each agent's utility function at the equilibrium allocation. For more on regular preferences and the differential approach to general equilibrium, see Mas-Colell (1985) and Balasko (1989) . Kreps (1988) reviews the theory of choice and utility representations of preferences. For Farkas's and Stiemke's Lemmas, and other forms of the Theorem of the Alternative, see Gale (1960) . Arrow and Debreu (1954) and, in a slightly different model, McKenzie (1954) are responsible for a proof of the existence of complete-markets equilibria. Debreu (1982) surveys the existence problem. Standard introductory treatments of general equilibrium theory are given by Debreu (1959) and Hildenbrand and Kirman (1989) . In this setting, with incomplete markets, Polemarchakis and Siconolfi (1993) address the failure of existence unless one has a portfolio θ with payoff D ⊤ θ > 0. Geanakoplos (1990) surveys other literature on the existence of equilibria in incomplete markets, some of which takes the alternative of defining security payoffs in nominal units of account, while allowing consumption of multiple commodities. Most of the literature allows for an initial period of consumption before the realization of the uncertain state. For a survey, see Magill and Shafer (1991) . Additional results on incomplete markets equilibrium include those of Araujo and Monteiro (1989), Berk (1997) , Boyle and Wang (1999), and Weil (1992) .
For related results in multiperiod settings, references are cited in the Notes of Chapter 2. The superdifferentiability result of Exercise 10(C) is due to Skiadas (1995) . Hellwig (1996) , Mas-Colell and Monteiro (1996), and Monteiro (1996) have shown existence of equilibrium with a continuum of states. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and Chae (1988) show existence in a model closely related to that studied in this chapter. Grodal and Vind (1988) and Yamazaki (1991) show existence with alternative formulations. With multiple commodities or multiple periods, existence is not guaranteed under any natural conditions, as shown by Hart (1975) , who gives a counterexample. For these more delicate cases, the literature on generic existence is cited in the Notes of Chapter 2.
The binomial option-pricing formula of Exercise 11 is from an early edition of Sharpe (1985) , and is extended in Chapter 2 to a multiperiod setting. The hint given for the demonstration of the Riesz representation exercise is condensed from the proof given by Luenberger (1969) of the Riesz-Frechet Theorem: For any Hilbert space H with inner product ( · | · ), any continuous linear functional F : H → R has a unique π in H such that F (x) = (π | x), x ∈ H. The Fixed Point Theorem of Exercise 4 is from Kakutani (1941) .
On the role of default and collateralization, see Geanakoplos and Zame (1999) and Sabarwal (1999) . Gottardi and Kajii (1999) study the role and existence of sunspot equilibria. Pietra (1992) treats indeterminacy. Lobo, Fazel, and Boyd (1999) address portfolio choice with fixed transactions costs.
